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Abstract
This paper develops a flow model in a dual labour market with heterogeneous workers and
heterogeneous jobs that allows for upward mobility or promotion flows via the internal market
and demotion or deskilling flows through the state of unemployment. Dynamic impulse-responses
analyses are used to examine the effects of labour market policies that aim to generate institutional
changes in the wage bargaining process, make job creation less costly or job matching more
efficiently to reduce unemployment, and increase competitiveness through a rise in labour
productivity. We find that the usual trade-off between wages and employment shows up clearly as
a result of changes in bargaining power. Moreover, the short-run and long-run effects on
unemployment of active labour market policy instruments differ considerably dependent on which
segment of the labour market is influenced initially. Finally, unemployment among workers
without experience (skills) goes down most strongly when productivity gains are not directed to
them directly, but - instead - realized for workers in the primary segment of the labour market.
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1. Introduction
The interest in labour market dynamics is growing at an increasing rate as becomes clear
from the high number of studies that make use of the flow-approach (see for a recent
overview, for example, Gautier, 1997). Attractive features of this flow--approach to the
labour market include - among other things - the evaporation of the distinction between
micro and macro-economics, its theoretical foundation in the search equilibrium model
(see e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1993, 1994) and - more in general - the insight to be
obtained for policy makers from gross labour market flows.
This paper builds on two streams of literature on flow models. First, the empirical
implementation of macro labour flow models to be used for policy analysis that
endogenizes the processes of wage formation and vacancy creation as developed in the
theoretical search equilibrium models (see Pissaiides,  1990, 1994). Previous studies of
empirical macro flow models for the Netherlands can be found in Gautier and Den Butter
(1995) in which wages and vacancies are endogenous in a homogenous labour market.
Den Butter and Gorter (1998) extend this empirical flow model by allowing for
heterogenous jobs (i.e., make a distinction between good and bad jobs) so that job-to-job
mobility is modelled endogenously also. The second strand of literature departs from the
Blanchard and Diamond’s model (1989, 1990) in which comovements of unemployment
and vacancies are modelled in the Beveridge space by means of an aggregate matching
function. In De Larquier (1998),  an internal labour market is added to this framework
with the existence of heterogeneous jobs (ranked in hierarchical order) and allows for
promotion flows through the internal labour market. The promotion flows then lead to a
segmented (dual) labour market of inexperienced and experienced workers.
The present paper develops a labour market flow model with heterogeneous jobs
and heterogeneous workers that allows for promotion flows through the internal market
(moving from a lower level to a upper level job) and “deskilling” flows through the state
of unemployment (losing work experience and effectively becoming inexperience again).
Hence, this paper extends the empirical labour market flow models with heterogeneous
jobs with heterogeneous workers and integrates this framework with the concept of
promotion flows  in an internal labour market. A vital characteristic of the model remains
that wages and job creation are endogenously modelled, that is determined by the optimal
behaviour of two types of individual workers and employers in a search-theoretical
framework (see Pissarides, 1990, 1994).
The ultimate goal of the paper is to calculate the effects of policy options that aim
to decrease unemployment, and in particular to lower unemployment among
inexperienced workers. Impulse response analyses are performed to estimate the effects
on the size and composition of unemployment of (i) institutional chances in the
bargaining process, (ii) various types of labour market policies (e.g., reduction of opening
cost of a vacancy), and (iii) external (productivity) shocks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic flow
model with heterogenous workers and heterogenous jobs. The calibration of the model to
compute a central projection (equilibrium) will be presented in section 3. The effects of a
number of policy measures will be obtained by using dynamic impulse-response
simulations in section 4 and subsequently discussed. Section 5 will offer some concluding
remarks.
,2. The Model
We consider a labour market flow model where an internal market is introduced with
two types of jobs (a: and 6)  ranked in hierarchical order and linked by a promotion flow.
In that way, we would like to model the macroeconomic consequence of the ‘job
experimentation’ microeconomic hypothesis: a match with an upper level position b is
possible only for who have previously succeed a match with a low level job CI  (Viscusi,
1983). Thus, the experimentation process induces a dynamic and endogeneous
segmentation of the labour force: people who occupy or look for a job a are
‘inexperienced’ workers, people who have been promoted t o a job b are ‘experienced’
workers.
More precisely, following Novos (1992),  we assum e that production is ‘a set of
activities for which people are more or less suited according to their ability and previous
experience’. In that case, when information on worker ability is not publicly observable,
firms gain efficiency when they integrate jobs a and b and use information on the
quality of the previous matches in low level jobs a to assign their employees to upper
level jobs b. Of course, firms can hire from the outside to fill jobs b but ‘hiring’ from
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inside (that is to say, promoting) may be less costly and may increase the chances of an
appropriate match. Information available to the employer on an experienced worker
who applies to a vacancy b is either a direct experimentation observed in his firm or a
resume of previous experience with other employers. The decision between promoting
(from inside) and recruiting (from outside) depends on the relative costs and efficiency
of internal and external information (which depend on organisational and institutional
parameters, as public, private or social networks).
Consequently, at a given date, the weight of internal labour market may vary
according to the organisation and development of internal and external markets, so may
the flow dynamics. For example, with a similar core assumption, G de Larquier (1998)
finds that temporary activity and reallocation shocks may be transformed into structural
irreversible ‘mismatch’ shocks via the internal labour market reaction. Bigger is the
initial promotion flow, bigger is the structural mismatch effect (and in an economy
without internal market, there is no permanent mismatch induced by a temporary
shock). However, we can regret that G. de Larquier (1998) focuses only on internal flow
and doesn’t allow any opposite flow between experienced and inexperienced
unemployment to counterbalance the internal effect.
In the present, we introduce a ‘deskilling’ flow from the state of experienced
worker to the state of inexperienced worker. This last flow occurs during unemployment
periods. So, we consider an economy where upward flows take place on the internal
market and downward flows on the external market. At this stage, Figure 1 summarises
the labour flow dynamics described.
Matches Matches with
with jobs b jobs n
promo ion
A A
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Figure 1. Worker flows.
More specifically, the model describes the various flows between the following
stocks at the macro level: E: employment;
V: vacancies;
U: unemployment.
Total employment (E) consists of two parts, low-level jobs (Ea) and upper-level jobs
(Eb) . .
E - Ea + Eb (1)
Consequently, vacancies may relate either to low or upper-level jobs (Va and Vb):
V Va + Vb (2)
Total unemployment is composed of inexperienced unemployed workers (Ui) and
experienced unemployed workers (Ue):
U
.
= Ul + Ue (3)
We consider both worker and job flows between these six stocks. Inflows and
outflows of vacancies are symbolised by Via, VIb, and VOa,  VOb.  We note Fxy a
worker flow from stock x to stock y: for example, Faui and Fuia represent the flow of
separated workers from Ea into Ui and the flow of new hired workers from Ui to Ea.
2.1. Matching Process.
The central feature of every labour flow models is the description of the matching
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mechanism in action. The supposed organisation of the six stocks Ea, Eb, Va, Vb, Ui
and Ue implies an internal market and two segments A and B on the external market. So
the process of matching workers and jobs is threefold: a promotion process (Fab) and
two market processes on the external segments (Fuia and Fueb).
a. The Promotion Process.
First we assume that a fraction y of the vacant jobs b are filled by promoting
workers employed in jobs u:
Fab = y.Vb (4)
Bigger y is (0 < y c I), more employers, in order to fill their upper-level positions, prefer
promoting workers coming from the internal market rather than recruiting experienced
unemployed workers on the external market B (from Ue). So the parameter y is crucial
for all the dynamics of the model. We interpret y as an institutional parameter: the
weight of the internal market in the economy. In our simulations, we attribute two
possible values to y: 17% and 27%.
At last, let &b be the rate at which an inexperienced employed worker in a job a
is promoted to a job b:
%b = FabLEa
b. The Market Process.
(5)
The process of matching unemployed workers and jobs is not instantaneous. On
each segment of the market, following Blanchard and Diamond, we formalize the hiring
activity by a matching function of unemployment and vacancies (with constant return to
Fuia = m,(Ui  ,Va)  = h, , UP  . Vaiaaa (6)
F u e b  = mt)(Ue,Vb)  = h, . Ue””  . Vb ‘+) (7)
a, and (l-a,) [ab  and (l-ab)]  are the weights given respectively to unemployment and
vacancies in the matching process on the external segment A [B]. h, and 3Lt, represent
the efficiency of the matching process (h,  > 0, & > 0 and 0 < a, < 1, 0 c ctb  < 1).
On the external market, inexperienced unemployed workers don’t compete with
experienced workers for high-position 6. That means that employers of jobs b are only
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looking for workers who have experienced a job a. On the other hand, the experienced
unemployed workers don’t compete with inexperienced workers for low-positions u. In
other words, experienced unemployed workers don’t agree to start again their careers
from the beginning. It isn’t unrealistic during the first periods of unemployment. But we
can imagine that experienced unemployed workers loss their skill over time. So there
exists a ‘deskilling’ or a ‘demotion’ flow from Ue to Ui: Fueui. Actually, this external
flow is the reverse of the internal promotion flow. Here, it is convenient to assume that
Fueui is a constant fraction of experienced unemployed workers:
Fueui = &Ue (8)
Finally, let ni and 7ce  be the escape probabilities respectively from Ui and Ue to
employmen t:
FuiaNi
FuebKJe
(9
(10)
2.2. Separations Process.
At any instant, employed workers may quit their jobs or may be dismissed. In the latter
case, there is no new vacancy because we assume that the reason of the dismissal is the
destruction of the jobi.  On the contrary, when a worker quits his job, his employer has
d
to post a vacancy to fill it again.
Let Faui and Fbue be the
separation rates, it holds on each
Faui =
F b u e  =
outflows from Ea and Eb, given sa  and sb  the respective
segment A and B:
s,.Ea
sb.Eb (12)
Let VIaui and VIbue be the numbers of jobs which become instantaneously a
vacancy again when someone quits a job a and b respectively. Given 8, and @b the part
of quits in total separations on each segment, we assume:
VIaui = B,.Faui (13
VIbue = &,.Fbue (14)
Higher 8, and @,  are, higher the part of ‘chuming’2  in worker mobility is. If 8, = 6b = 1,
’ In France and Holland, it is not allowed to hire and fire simultaneously for the same job.
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all separations are induced by workers only, without job destruction (total churning or
‘pure’ worker mobility). If 8, = @,  = 0, all separations are produced by job destruction
(no churning or ‘total constrained’ worker mobility). Consequently, 8, and &,  may be
also interpreted as continuation job probabilities. Note that the continuation probability
of jobs CI  quit by promoted workers is supposed equal to 1; that is to say, Fab more
vacancies a are posted.
At this stage, it follows from our matching and separation assumptions that
employment and unemployment dynamics are given by four equations (stocks are
calculated at the beginning of each period t; flows are calculated at the end of each
period t):
Es(t)  = Ea(t-1) + Fuia(t-1) - Faui(t-1) - Fab(t-1) (I%
Eb(t) = Eb(t-1) + Fueb(t-1) - Fbue(t-1) (16)
U i ( t )  = Ui(t-1) - Fuia(t-1) + Faui(t-1) + Fueui(t-1) (17)
Ue(t) = Ue(t-1) - Fueb(t-I)  + Fbue(t-1) - Fueui(t-1) (18)
To write job flows dynamics in the same way, we have to specify the job
creation process which closely depends on the wage formation.
2.3. Job Creation Process.
In the equilibrium, Va and Vb have to be such that opening new jobs a and b are no
more profitable for employers. Thus Va and Vb result from a rational calculation. But,
at the beginning of each period some vacancies a and b are inherited as the product of
the previous matching and separation dynamics. Consequently, given the optimal values
Va and Vb, employers have to adjust the both stocks of vacancies: to obtain the optimal
levels Va and Vb, sometimes they create new vacancies, sometimes they destroy old
vacancies inherited from the previous periods. Let’s describe the vacancy dynamics in
details.
For jobs a:
with:
Va(t) = Va(t- 1) + Via(t)  - VOa(t-1)
VOa(t) = Fuia(t-1)
(1%
(20)
Via(t)  = VIaui(t) + VIaa + Fab(t-1) (21)
For jobs b:
Vb(t) = Vb(t-1) + VIb(t) - VOb(t-1) (22)
VOb( t) = Fueb(t-1) (23)
VIb(t) = VIbue(t) + VIbb(t) (24)
Equations (20) and (23) mean that outflows of vacancies VOa and VOb  are
associated with the successful matches described by the two matching functions. They
are equal to the worker flows from unemployment (Ui and Ue) to employment (Ea and
Eb). Equations (21) and (24) imply that inflows of vacancies Via  and VIb are partly
induced by pure worker mobility (quits without job destruction). At last, VIaa and VIbb
are adjustment variables. They may be positive (vacancy creation) or negative (vacancy
destruction) in order that equations (19) and (22) are equal
values of Va and Vb.
To settle Va or Vb, we need to know the expected
vacancy a or b. Obviously, this expected profit depends on
respectively to the optimal
profit from opening a new
the expected match surplus
and the sharing rule of this surplus between the employer and the worker. So wage
formation plays a key role in the determination of the supply of vacancies.
2.4. Wage Formation.
Before specifying the employer’s and worker’s expected returns from a job and then
describing the wage formation, we need to introduce some useful notations:
qa: rate at which an employer with a vacancy a finds a worker: qa  = Fuia/Va;
qb: rate at which an employer with a vacancy b finds a worker: qb  = FuebNb;
ka,  kb: costs of opening a job a or b;
ya, yb: output of a match with job a or b;
wa, wb: wage of a job a or b;
r: discount rate.
Wage formation is modelled in a similar framework as developed by F. den
Butter and C. Gorter (1998). They settle the different expected profits to employers in a
dual labour market where jobs are “good” or “bad”, occupied or vacant. We do the same
thing for our jobs n and b in the segmented labour market. In the other hand, F. den
Butter and C. Gorter assume homogenous workers and determine their asset values as
employed or unemployed. Here, we have to distinguish inexperienced and experienced
workers cases.
In case of an unfilled job a, the expected profit from opening a vacancy a is
denoted by Za. It holds that:
sZa  = -k,  + q,(Ja - Za) (25)
The asset value of an unfilled job n (rZa) is equal to the probability that a vacancy a is
filled (qa) times the associated change in value when it is filled (Ja - Za) minus the costs
of having an open position (ka).
If the job is filled, Ja, the expected profit, satisfies:
rJa = ya  - wa - s,(Ja - 0,Za) - n,b(Ja - Za) (26)
The asset value of a filled job u is equal to the productivity in job a (net of wage costs)
minus the change in wealth when a job separation takes place and the job becomes
vacant (the separation rate times the continuation probability: sa&)  or when a
promotion occurs with a probability 7tnb (here, the continuation job probability is equal
to 1).
In the same way, the expected profit from opening a vacancy b is denoted by Zb.
rZb = -kb  + q,,(Jb  - Zb) (2-V
where Jb is the expected profit if a job b is filled:
rJb = yb  - wb - sb(Jb  - &Zb) (28)
The asset value of a filled job b is equal to the productivity in job b (net of wage costs)
minus the change in wealth when a job separation takes place and the job becomes
vacant (the separation rate times the continuation probability: s&b).
In equilibrium, the rents of opening new jobs are assumed to be fully exploited
which makes the expected profits of having a vacancy equal to zero. That is Za = Zb =O.
Thus, equations (25) and (27) become:
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Ja = k$sa wo
Jb = kdqb ww
Let us now present the workers asset values of being inexperienced or
experienced unemployed and employed in either a job a or b. The asset value of being
inexperienced and unemployed is rBi:
rBi = ni(Wa - Bi) (29)
The asset value of being inexperienced unemployed worker depends on the wealth gains
of becoming employed in a job a times the probability to get that job, with Wa the
expected utility of being inexperienced and employed in a job CI.
rWa = wa - s,(Wa - Bi) + z,b(Wb - Wa) (30)
The asset value of having a job a is equal to the wage plus the wealth gain of being
promoted to a job b with the probability 7~~b (given Wb the expected utility of being
experienced and employed) minus the wealth loss that occurs in case of a separation
with probability s.
In the same way, the asset of being experienced and unemployed is rBe:
rBe = ne(Wb - Be) - 6(Be - Bi) (31)
where 6 is the probability that the worker losses his skills and becomes an inexperienced
unemployed worker. At last, the asset value of being experienced and employed in a job
b is:
rWb = wb - Sb(Wb  - Be) (32)
The asset of having a job b is equal to the wage minus the wealth loss that occurs in
case of a separation.
b. Wage bargaining and formation.
It is assumed that wages split the surplus of a match between the worker and the
firm. So we get for jobs a:
Wa-Bi = p [(Ja - Za) + (Wa - Bi)] (33
and for jobs b, this becomes:
Wb-Be = p [(Jb - Zb) + (Wb - Be)] (34)
where p is the worker’s share of the match surplus.
Using now the no-profit conditions (Za = Zb =0), together with (26), (30),  (31)
and (33) for the final step, we obtain for wa:
1 0
w;, = py,  +(1-~)(r+~L~,)Bi-(1-~)5[(n,  +r+S)Be--6Bi]
“e
and using (28),  (32),  and (34),  we get for We:
c. Stecldy state  equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the following conditions hold:
(i) In steady state, all stocks are constant:
AEa=AUi=AUe=AEb=O (37)
that is:
AEa=O < Fuia = Faui + Fab
AUe=O a Fbue = Fueb + Fueui
AUi=O a Fueui + Faui = Fuia
AEb=O u Fab + Fueb = Fbue
(Obviously, the third first conditions imply the fourth one.)
(ii) Rents of jobs a are exhausted:
Ja = k,/qa
(iii) Rents of jobs h are exhausted:
cw
Jb = k,,/qb (27W
The model can now be solved for the stocks of vacancies (Va and Vb) by
making use of the conditions for vacancy entry (ii) and (iii). The asset values of
unemployment become (using (29) and (33)):
PrBi =- Va
1 P
k a ’- Ul (38)
and using (31) and (34):
P(r+S)Be=-
1-p (39)
Finally, the equations for the vacancy variables become as follows:
V a Y a -Wa
Fuia--
r+s;,  +n,,  k,
(40)
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V b Yb-Wb--
(r+s,)k,  -Y(Yb  -Wb)
Fueb (41)
3. Calibration and baseline simulations
Our examination of the model starts by computing a central projection of the simulation
experiments. The central projection (or baseline simulation) is computed as a dynamic
equilibrium of our model, based on average monthly values for the exogenous flow
variables and also conditional on the equilibrium values of the (endogenous) stock-
variables (see for similar analyses, Den Butter and Gorter, 1998, and Den Butter and Van
Dijk, 1998).
The basic projection assumes 400,000 unemployed, and a total level of
employment of 6 million, which mimics the situation in the Netherlands in the beginning
of 90’s. It should be emphasized that in the baseline simulation of our model all stocks and
flows are constant, but not exogenous (except total labour force equal to 6,4  million). The
stocks of employment and unemployment are endogenous in the model and will deviate
from their equilibrium values in impulse simulations where the economy is hit by a shock
which brings it temporarily out of equilibrium. To solve the model numerically we use the
equations describing the optimal level of vacancies (type a and b, see equations (40) and
(41) in section 2) jointly with the - first three - equilibrium conditions of constant stocks
(that is, inflow equals outflow) of the two types of employment and unemployment (see
also section 2). Given the initial fixed levels of total employment and total
unemployment, this results in a non-linear system of five equations in which four
endogenous variables have to determined (Va,Vb,Ea,Ui) and to which the promotion
flow-variable (Fab) can be added to resolve this systemj.  This implies that it is chosen to
fix the promotion rate in the internal labour market (y)  when simulation experiments are
to be carried out (as will be the topic of the subsequent section). The motivation to choose
to anchor this structural parameter is that different kind of labour markets in terms of the
importance of the internal labour market (relative size of the promotion flow) can be used
’ Alternative choices could be made here, for example one of the matching flows (type a or b)  could be
taken instead which would fix the corresponding matching efficiency parameter (type a or b)  in the
simulations. Note that this was the approach followed in the previous empirical flow models for the Dutch
labour market (see Den Butter and Gorter, 1998, Den Butter and Van Dijk, 1998 and Gautier and Den
Butter, 1995).
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as a reference when evaluating the effects of several policy options. In other words, the
differences in the use of promotion flows can be interpreted as variations in the
institutional functioning of the labour market. Therefore, we compute two central
projections of the model, the first (Model I) being a labour market with a relatively high
promotion flow (in which about 1 out of 4 jobs of type b happen to be filled via internal
recruitment of a worker occuT>ving  a iob ~4)  and the second version (Model II) having aAd  v  J /
lower level for the promotion flow (in which the odds to fill a t
intelma  market turn out to be approximately 1 out of 6)4.
The model is solved using numerical procedures from
We stress that our calibration does not purport to yield a centra
rpe  b job by means of the
the GAUSS-programme.
projection which gives a
good dynamic description of the historical time path of the endogenous variables of the
flow model. The sole aim of our baseline simulation is to mimic a dynamic flow
equilibrium as a reference scenario, which - to some extend - look likes the actual
situation. For example, the structural parameters are calibrated such that the -
endogenously determined - employment and vacancy stock is roughly equally divided
between the segments (A and B). Moreover, the total stock of vacancies is calibrated to be
close to its actual value of about 100-l 10,000 in the beginning of the 90’s.
In our “baseline’‘-versions of the model, we do not estimate the matching-
parameters on vacancies, unemployment and employed job seekers, but choose fixed
values in line with previous empirical work for the Netherlands (a, and ab  are both set
equal to OS), see e.g. Van Ours, 1991, Gorter and Van Ours, 1994. The matching
efficiency parameters are calibrated in our model and are selected to be equal to 0.8.
To calibrate the model we further need to select values for the structural
parameters in the “job creation”-part of the model on (i) costs of opening a job (k,, kb),  (ii)
real value of the production in the two segments (ya,  yb)  (iii) worker’s/firm’s share ((p/l-
p> of the match-surplus in both segments, and (iv) the discount rate (r). We take the
following figures in the central projection: ya=0.5,  yb=I,  k,=2.5,  kb=6,  p=O.S  and r=O.O3
(in Model 1)/0.02  (in Model II).
Finally, parameters have to be settled that are related to the worker and job flows
4 Empirical evidence on the actual value of the promotion flow for the Dutch labour amrket is scarcely
available. Figures on the hiring and internal mobility for the  Netherlands in 1990 (see Hassink,  1996)
suggest  that  the Netherlands suggest  that  the average size of the promotion f low is  in-between the range of 1
out of 6 - I out of 4 (Model I-Model II).
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through the labour market (in addition to the matching and promotion flows): the
separation flows of workers (determined by separation rates sa  and sb),  the “deskilling”
flow of workers (described by the deskilling rate 6) and the flows of replacement jobs
(continuation probabilities set by Ba,  C&J.  In our central projections, we have taken the
following configuration of values: sa--0.03, sb=O.O2,  6=0.20  (in Model Q/O.10  (in Model
II), and 8,=&,=0.5.
In Table 1, we present the numerical values of a set of (endogenous) variables of
particular interest for our baseline models. In baseline I, we have the case of a relatively
high promotion flow of employed workers together with a relatively high “deskilling”
flow of unemployed workers, whereas in baseline IT both the promotion and the deskilling
flow are substantially lower. In brief, the first model can be classified as a “high rotation”
labour market (flows from type a to type b, and flows from experienced to inexperienced
are higher) and model II can be referred to a “low rotation” labour market,
For both baseline-versions, we have reached our objective to get about equal
shares of employment and vacancies in the two labour market segments (A and B).
Unemployment among experience workers is about four times as small as unemployment
among inexperienced workers (both in absolute and relative terms). The wage levels do
also show close resemblance between the baseline-versions, although the wage level in
type b jobs appears to be somewhat higher in the low rotation labour market. The major
difference between the two reference-scenario’s emerge naturally at the size of the
promotion (deskilling flow)? the flows in the high rotation labour market are about twice
as large as in the low rotation labour market. Other deviations, but of a much smaller
magnitude, arise at the probability to get a type a job (by an inexperienced worker) which
is 2%-points lower in the low rotation labour market, while - at the demand side - the
mean duration to hire a experienced worker is 0.2 months higher in the high rotation
labour market. A final remark concerns the difference in the level of average length of the
vacancy chain that is defined as the total number of replacement jobs plus the newly
created jobs over the total number of newly created jobs. The length of this chain is
somewhat higher in the high rotation labour market which is basically due to the higher
promotion flows in that version of the central projection. Note that it is assumed to have
5 As can be easily derived from the equilibrium conditions (see section 2), the promotion and deskilling flow
should be equal  in  equi l ibr ium.
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each type a job refilled that is left due to an internal promotion (see also equation (21)
section 2 which shows that the relevant continuation probability has been fixed at 1).
Table 1 Characteristics of equilibrium path of a baseline simulation
for a (selected) set of endogenous variables
-
Baseline I Baseline II
(high rotation) (low rotation)
Parameter values
promotion rate (computed) 0.27 0.17
deskilling rate (fixed) 0 . 2 0 0.10
Variables
. inexp. unemployed (% of Ea)
exp. unemployed (% of Eb)
3 14 (10.6%)
86 ( 2.5%)
employment in type a jobs 2 6 4 0 3 0 5 4
employment in type b jobs 3 3 6 0 2 9 4 6
vacancies of type c;1  jobs 4 6 5 0
vacancies of type b jobs 6 3 5 5
wage in type a job (% of prod. in n> 0.42 (84%) 0.43 (86%)
wage in type b job (% of prod. in 6) 0.72 (72%) 0.78 (78%)
“deslsilling” flow (per month)
promotion flow (per month)
1 7
1 7
probability to get a job (type a> 0.31 0.29
probability to get a job (type b) 0 . 5 9 0.59
vacancy duration in months (type a) 0.5 05.
vacancy duration in months (type b) 1.3 11.
vacancy chain 2 6. 23.
314 (9.3%)
86 ( 2.8%)
9
9
1 5
4. Impulse response analysis.
To show the labour market dynamics due to changes in the structural parameters, we
present simulation exercises of our model in this section. The shocks given to the system
consist of the following categories of (labour market) policies:
0i (De)regulution measures that lead to institutional changes in the bargaining
process.
Here, the focus will be on the impact of a change in bargaining power on - in
particular - (un)employment  and wage levels. What happens with the size and
composition of (un)employment  if for instance the employers obtain more
bargaining power than their counterpart (note that in the baseline-versions, both
parties have equal power). In practice, one can think for example of deregulation
measures that break down the organizing power of the union and hence give rise
to a shift in the balance of power towards the employers. The reverse pattern,
which might reflect a trend towards centralised bargaining giving - de facto - more
control to unions, will also be examined.
( >ii Active labour murket  policies that aim to reduce unemployment.
Various measures to stimulate the creation of jobs will be analyzed within this
category. Specific attention will be paid to the effects of reducing the opening
costs of a vacancy and increasing the efficiency of matching in each of two
segments of the labour market (A and B). Moreover, we look at the consequences
of a reduction in the deskilling of unemployed workers (so making the likelihood
lower that experienced workers become inexperienced, i.e., loss their skills).
(iii) Policies to increase competitiveness (employment) through a rise in productivity.
To simulate the consequences of a general policy directed at the enhancement of
technical progress and human capital, e.g. by increased investments in R&D
and/or schooling, we analyze the effects of an increase in productivity for both
segments in the labour market (A and B).
All simulations are conducted with both alternative dynamic equilibria as baseline,
where Baseline I mimics the high rotation labour market and Baseline II the low rotation
labour market, so that differences in impulse responses indicate the sensitivity of the
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effects of the policy measures for differences in the dynamics (flows through) of the
segmented labour market.
The dynamic simulations are based on myopic foresight of the agents. This
implies that employers create new jobs in each period according to the vacancy supply
relations (see equations (40) and (41)),  given the disequilibrium values for stocks and
flows in this period! Changes in the structural parameters will thus immediately have
their impact on the level of vacancies and wages. The wage levels will be affected
instantaneously in two ways (see equations (35) and (36) in section 2): directly via the
change in the structural parameters and indirectly via the changes in the outside options of
unemployment (inexperienced Bi and experienced Be). After this initial change, the wage
level in segment B will hardly be further influenced because the outside options of
employment remain almost constant over time (given the new set of structural parameters,
and the assumption of myopic behaviours). In contrast, the wage level in segment A is
also determined by the transitions rates (related to flows in and out segment B) in the
labour market which will continuously adjust over time when the labour market is moving
to a new equilibrium. Therefore, the wages in type 61  jobs will show a gradual adjustment
over time if the shock affects originally segment B in the labour market. This feature of
our model is related to the dual nature of the labour market in which changes in segment
A will not affect segment B, but changes in segment B do influence segment A. The latter
happens because of the changes that occur in the promotion flows (from segment A to B)
and “deskilling” flows (from segment B to A).7
A relevant question that comes forward of this functioning of the segmented
labour market is whether measures to enhance employment (reducing opening costs,
increasing matching efficiency, increasing productivity) are more effective (in the long-
run) in segment A or B. Of course, the answer to this question will also be dependent on
the degree of rotation (high or low) in the labour market. But it will definitely give
suggestions to policy-makers where limited budgets on labour market policies have to be
spend to achieve the maximum result.
’ An alternative approach could be to assume that the agents have perfect foresight and hence “jump” to the
new equilibrium values for the inflow of new jobs immediately. This exercise is left for future research on
this  topic .
7 The reason is that a change in Vb induces a change in Fab (see equation (4)): promotion fiows  are
function of the number of vacancies b and don’t depend on the number of internal applicants occupying
jobs a. In the same way, flows Fueui vary only if there is a change in Ue (see equation (8)): we don’t take
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We present the results of the simulation exercises related to the policy measures
described above in Tables 2 to 10. The tables show the effects on the set of endogenous
variables included in Table 1.
Tables 2 and 3 give the effects of a change in the bargaining parameter p: in Table
2 union power is higher than employer’s power in bargaining, in Table 3 the opposite is
true. In case unions are able to absorb a higher share of the surplus generated in the
matches, we naturally see higher wages occur in both segments of the labour market (with
the largest increase in segment B). Simultaneously, unemployment rises substantially and
continues to rise over time (and more strongly in the high rotation labour market in which
the wage-growth is higher also). The “shadow side” of the wage growth appears to
manifest itself in the high unemployment level for inexperienced workers because the
dynamics in the dual labour market are largely reduced (in other words, the inexperienced
workers get tied in unemployment). The reverse pattern emerges when employers can
restrain wages. Jointly with wage moderation, a process of upward mobility (“climbing up
the ladder”) for inexperienced workers is stirred enormously due to the massive creation
of type b jobs. These new jobs of type b are partly filled through promotion flows that
lead to the replacements of type a jobs (i.e., the vacancy chain-effect). Apparently, our
model is capable to exhibit the usual trade-off between wages and (un)employment  very
well (see also Figure 2). In particular, it reveals that the choice is between higher wages
for a smaller group of experienced workers and more unemployment among the
inexperienced or lower wages for a larger group of experienced workers and less
unemployment among the inexperienced.
Next, we look at the impact of active labour market policies that attempt to reduce
unemployment. First, let us consider the repercussions of a decrease in the opening cost of
vacancies in segment A or B. As was addressed before, a change in opening costs in
segment A has an instant effect on wages and (un)employment  (see Table 4),  whereas a
change in opening costs of vacancies in segment B has long-run implications for both
segments (see Table 5). Interestingly, it depends on the size of the promotion (and
demotion) rate in the labour market whether the net effect on (un)employment  is larger in
case of encouraging job creation in segment A or B. The high rotation labour market
gives better results - after about 15 years unemployment becomes lower, see also Figure 3
into account the level of Ui.
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- for a reduction in opening costs of type b jobs, while implementing this instrument in the
low rotation labour market does not outperform (after 20 years) the instantaneous results
of a reduction in opening cost of type a jobs. Second, an analysis is carried out in which
the efficiency of matching is enlarged in one of the segments (see Table 6 and 7). The
main lesson to be learned from the results for this instrument is that the emphasis should
be on improving matching efficiency in segment A (with the larger pool of unutilized
workers). The immediate effect on unemployment in segment A appears to be larger than
the long-un effects of enhancing efficiency in segment B (see Figure 4). Improving
efficiency in segment B does lead to a growing (shrinking) employment in segment B
(A), but does not have positive feed-back effects on segment A via the internal labour
market (the promotion flow becomes even smaller). A third alternative of an active labour
market policy is to avoid that experienced unemployed workers lose their skills (for
example, training and schooling-programmes could be used for this purpose). The effects
of a decrease in the deskilling rate are displayed in Table 8, but appear to be quite modest.
Because of the lower outflow from experienced unemployment (into inexperienced
unemployment), the composition of unemployment is adjusted in favour of the
inexperienced workers. Actually, the short-run effect is an increase in unemployment (and
a higher wage level in type b jobs due to the improvement in the outside option of being
an experienced unemployed), but in longer run the labour market recovers (see Figure 5).
Employment in segment B (A) grows (shrinks) and gradually employment growth in
segment B is slightly larger than the reduction in segment A. Obviously, a parallel
movement in unemployment is observed.
Finally, our interest is directed towards policies targeted at productivity
improvements for each type of job. In contrast to the conclusion drawn with respect to
labour market efficiency, it becomes clear that affecting productivity in segment B is -
after a short period of time - much more effective than doing so in segment A (see Table 9
and 10). The dynamics initiated by a stimulus of productivity in segment B are strong as
can be seen from the substantial increases in the promotion flows (and the related rise in
the length of the vacancy-chain). This leads to a major decrease of unemployment among
inexperienced workers and a minor expansion of unemployment among experienced
workers. The resulting pattern of unemployment over time is shown in Figure 6. The
latter observation is however mainly due to the shift in the composition of employment.
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Hence, a remarkable conclusion arises from this simulation experiment: to reduce
unemployment among inexperienced workers, the most effective policy option is to
increase (further) the productivity of experienced workers (instead of enhancing the
productivity of the inexperienced workers themselves). In other words, job creation in
segment B appears to generate a dynamic (stepping-stone) process that is more helpful for
inexperienced workers than stimulating job creation directly for this type of workers. This
dynamic process due to the vacancy chain mechanism (see for example Garter  and
Schettkat, 1994) is sometimes referred to as “keep the chimney smoking”.
5. Conclusions.
This paper develops a labour flow model with heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous
jobs that allows for promotion and demotion flows. The matching of workers and vacant
jobs takes place in the two segments of the external labour market. Upward worker flows
occur in the internal market (via promotion), and downward or deskilling flows are
transmitted through the state of unemployment (i.e., unemployed workers are losing their
skills/experience).
Dynamic impulse-response analyses reveal the effects of various policy options by
means of changes in the structural parameters in the flow model. The simulation
experiments bring forward the familiar trade-off between wages and employment when
the balance of power in the bargaining process between employers and employees
(union’s) is shifted. Active labour market policies can help to reduce aggregate
unemployment most effectively in the short run by reducing the opening costs of
vacancies or improving matching efficiency of “low level” jobs (in the secondary
segment). However, the long-run impact on unemployment of similar active policies
targeted at “high level” jobs (influencing initially the primary segment) will become more
favourable than those affecting the secondary segment when the promotion (and
demotion) flow in the labour market is sufficiently large. Institutional differences in the
use of the internal market may therefore be of critical importance for the effectiveness of
active labour market policies. Improving the productivity of experienced workers turns
out to be more beneficial for the employment prospects of the group of inexperienced
workers than enlarging the productivity of this group itself (with an equally high
20
percentage). The dynamic nature of the dual labour market in which the barrier between
the segments are opened by means of upward mobility flows is responsible for this result.
In conclusion, the results of the exercises to evaluate labour market policies
underline the importance of the incorporation of feedback-mechanism in a dynamic
labour market flows model (such as the concept of the vacancy chain) that aims to shed
light on the effectiveness of a variety of policy options.
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Table 2 Effects of an increase in bargaining parameter: p=O.55
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.) 37.9 71.9 104.5
unemployment (exp.) 6 8  . -4 . 3 -15.0
employment in type CII jobs 50 379.0 742.6
employment in type b jobs -49.7 -446.7 -832.1
vacancies for type a jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type a job (x100)
wage in a type h job (x100)
wage ratio wdw,  (x100)
“deskilling” flow 13. -0 9. -3 0.
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x 100) -10.4 -19.3 -26.7 -3 1.
baseline I, after
l Yr 10 yrs 20 yrs
44.7 67.7 89.4
-4 . 1 - 0  2 35
-9 . 8 -11.1 -22.3
09 . 10 . 11.
2 5  . 2 5  . 2 5  .
-0 . 8 -0 . 6 -0 . 4
-2 . 7 -4 . 4 -6 l 1
baseline II, after
1 Y’
42.1
34.4
77.
-14.3
-27.8
-4 9.
-7 0.
07.
21.
- 0  6.
- 0  8.
-1 1.
10 yrs 2 0 yrs
53.8 65.4
52.1 70.0
16 . -4 . 6
163.1 347.1
-216.9 -412.6
-1d.I  - 2  8 -13.3 -0 7
0 7  . 0 8  .
21  . 21  .
-0 . 5 -0 . 5
02 . -0 . 5
-1 . 6 -2 . 1
-5 . 1 -6 . 9
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Table 3 Effects of a decrease in bargaining parameter: p=O.45
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.)
unemployment (exp.)
employment in type a jobs
employment in type b jobs
vacancies for type a jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type a job (x100)
wage in a type b job (x100)
wage ratio wdwg (x100)
“deskilling” flow
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x100) 13.6 32.9 63.9
baseline I, after
l Yr 1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-40.3 -64.2 -94.4
-34.0 -69.1 -113.8
-6 . 3 49 . 19.4
-11.8 -473.7 -1064
52.2 537.9 1159
1;2  42 . 2i.7  -1  8 3i.2 - 9  4
-0 . 9 -14 . -2 . 3
-2 . 6 -2 . 6 -2 . 6
08 l 02 . -1 . 1
-1 . 3 10 . 39 .
30 . 5 9  . 96 .
baseline II, after
l Yr
-38.1
-31.1
-7 0.
10.1
28.0
52.
78.
-0 7.
-2 2.
06.
-0 7.
1 2.
38.
1 0 yrs 20 yrs
-48.8 -61.4
-47.3 -66.5
-1 . 5 5 1  .
-188.6 -425.8
237.4 487.2
12.2 24 -1 Ii.5 0
-0 . 8 -0 . 9
-2 .  1 -2 .  1
05 . 0 3  .
-0 . 1 0 5  .
19 . 2 7  .
66 . 10.2
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Table 4 Effects of a decrease in opening costs in segment A, k,: -10  %
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.)
unemployment (exp.)
employment in type u jobs
employment in type b jobs
vacancies for type a jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type a job (x100)
wage in a type b job (x100)
wage ratio wdw,  (x100)
“deskilling”  flow
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x 100)
baseline I, after baseline II, after
1 Yr
-73.1
-73.1
0 0.
73.4
-0  2.
16.8
-0  0.
16.
0 0.
2 2.
0 0.
-0  0.
-1 3.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-73.1 -73.1
-73.1 -73.0
-0 . 0 -0 ,  1
75.3 77.5
-2 .Y 3 -4 , 4
16.8 16.8
-0 . 1 -0  .  1
16 . 16 .
00 . 00 .
2 2  . 22 .
-0 . 0 -0 . 0
-00 . - 00 .
-1 . 3 -1 . 3
10  yrs 20 yrs
-72.3 -72.3 -72.3
-72.3
0 0.
7 2 . 4
-0 1.
17.8
-0 0.
13.
00.
17.
-72.3
0 0.
-72.3
-0 0.
72.9
-0 6l
73.4
-1 1.
17.8 17.8
-0  0. -0  0.
13.
00.
17.
13l
0 0.
17.
0 0.
-0  0.
-0  4.
0 0. -0 0.
-0 0l -0 0.
-0  4. -0  4.
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Table 5 Effects of a decrease in opening costs in segment B, kb: -10 %
baseline I, after baseline II, after
1 Yr
Effects on
unemployment -20.1
unemployment (inexp.) -12.1
unemployment (exp.)  -8.0
employment in type u jobs -47.1
employment in type b jobs 67.3
vacancies for type a jobs -0.7
vacancies for type b jobs 14.6
wage in a type a job (x100) -0.3
wage in a type b job (x100) 1.9
wage ratio wdw,  (x 100) - 1.9
“deskilling” flow -1  6.
promotion flow 4 0.
vacancy chain (x 100) 18.5
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-56.7 -104.8
-63.2 -130.6
65  . 25.8
-651.1 -1455
707.8 - 1 5 5 9
2 9 . 0  - 7  7 -17.1 48.2
-0 . 8 -2 . 6
19 . 19 .
-2 . 7 -5 . 0
13 . 52  .
7 9  . 13.1
4 6 . 9 9 9 . 9
1 Yr
-14.5
-6 3.
-8  2.
-18.6
33.0
-0  2.
93.
-0 1.
15.
-1  2.
-0 8.
15.
4 7.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-29.1 -46.8
-27.4 -52.9
-1 . 7 61  .
-253.1 -536.7
2 8 2 . 2 5 8 3 . 4
-3  2
16.7
-6  8
21..  1
-0 . 2 -0 . 4
16 . 16 .
- 1 4  . -1 . 6
-0 . 2 0 6  .
23  . 33  .
82  . 12.7
26
Table 6 Effects of a increase in matching-efficiency in segment A, h,: +25 %
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.)
unemployment (exp.)
employment in type u jobs
employment in type b jobs
vacancies for type u jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type n job (x100)
wage in a type b job (x100)
wage ratio wdwg (x200)
“deskilling” flow
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x 100)
baseline I,  after
.l Yl
-64.9
-65.0
0 0.
65.1
-0  2.
-7  4.
-0  0.
14.
0 0.
20.
0 0.
-0  0.
-1 1.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-65.0 -64.9
-64.9 -64.8
- 0 0  . - 01 .
6 6 . 9 68.8
-1 . 9 -3 9c
-7 . 4 -7 3L
-0 . 1 -0 . 1
14 . 14 .
0 0  . 0 0  .
2 0  . 20  .
- 0 0  . - 00l
- 0 0  . - 0 0  .
-1 . 1 -1 . 2
baseline II, after
-64.2
-64.2
0 0.
64.2
-0 1.
-8  2.
-0  0.
12.
0 0.
15.
0 0.
-0  0.
-0  4.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-64.2 -64.2
-64.2 -64.2
0 0  . -0 . 0
64.7 65.2
-0 . 5 -1 . 0
-8 . 2 -8 . 2
-0 . 0 -0  0l
12 . 12 .
0 0  . 0 0  .
15 . 15 .
0 0  . -0 . 0
-0 . 0 -0 . 0
-0 . 4 -0 . 4
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Table 7 Effects of a increase in matching-efficiency in segment B, Lb:  +25  %
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.) -14.0
unemployment (exp.) -15.8
employment in type a jobs
employment in type b jobs
vacancies for type a jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type a job (x100)
wage in a type b job (x100)
wage ratio wdwg (x100)
“deskilling” flow
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x100)
baseline I, after baseline II, after
l Yr
-29.8
-3 1
32.9
-0  9.
- 5  8.
- 0  0.
34.
- 2  7.
- 3  2.
- 1  6.
- 7  8.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-40.2 -52.2
-27.9 -44.0
-12.3 -8.2
-162.1 -347.9
202.2 400.1
-2 . 8 -5 . 0
-3 . 0 03 .
-0 . 1 -0 . 3
3 4  . 34 .
-2 . 8 -3 0l
-2 . 5 -1 . 6
-0 .  8 00 .
-3 . 6 15 .
1 Yr
-23.9
-6 7
-1;2.
-0 2
24 1.
-0 6.
-7 0.
0 0.
32.
-2 2.
-1  7.
- 1  1.
- 3  8.
10 yrs 2 0 yrs
-28.1 -32.8
-12.4 -18.8
-15.7 -13.9
-62.2 -132.8
90.3 165.6
-14 . -2 . 3
-6 . 0 -4 . 8
-0 . 0 -0 . 0
3 2  . 3 2  .
-2 . 2 -2 . 3
-1 . 6 - 1 4  .
-0 . 9 -0 . 7
-3 . 2 -2 . 4
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Table 8 Effects of a decrease in deskilling rate, 6 : -25%
baseline I, after
Effects on
unemployment 19.
unemployment (inexp.) -10.9
unemployment (exp.) 12.9
employment in type u jobs -10.9
employment in type b jobs 8.9
vacancies for type c1  jobs -0.8
vacancies for type b jobs -2.7
wage in a type cI  job (x100) -0.0
wage in a type b job (x100) 1.9
wage ratio wdw,  (x100) -1.5
“deskilling” flow - 2  3.
promotion flow -0 7t
vacancy chain (x 100) -3.5
10 yrs 2 0 yrs
-7 . 1 -17.6
-25.1 -41.6
18.0 23.9
-175.9 -369.2
183.0 386.8
-2 . 8 -5 . 0
0 4  . 40 .
-0 * 1 -0 . 3
19 . 19  .
-1  . 7 -1 . 9
-1 . 6 -0 . 7
01 . 11 .
12 . 7 0  .
baseline II, after
l Yl.
53.
-5  5
l0s.
-5 1.
-0 2.
- 0  5.
36.
00.
1 7.
-1  2.
-1 3.
- 0  6.
- 1  9.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
0 9  . -4 . 1
-12.6 -20.7
13.5 16.6
-83.2 -172.5
82.3 176.6
-1 . 5 -2 . 7
-2 . 1 -0 . 5
-0 . 0 -0 0l
17 . 17 .
-1 . 2 -1 . 3
-1 .  1 -0 . 9
-0 . 3 -0 . 1
- 1 0  . -0 . 0
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Table 9 Effects of an increase in productivity of segment A, y,: +lO %
baseline I, after baseline II, after
1 Yr 10 yrs 20 yrs .l Yf 10 yrs 20 yrs
-12.1 -12.0 -11.9 -12.7 -12.7 -12.6
-12.1
00.
12.4
-0  3.
23.
-0 1.
47.
00.
65.
-12.0
-0 0.
-11.8
-0 1.
-12.7 -12.6
00. -0 0.
15.0
-3 0.
17.9
-6 0.
23. 23.
-0 1. -0 2.
47. 47.
00. 00.
65. 65.
-12.7
00.
12.8
-0 1.
25.
-0 0.
47.
00.
60.
13.6
-0 9.
14.5
-1 8.
25.
-0 0.
2.5
-0  1.
47. 47.
00. 00.
60. 60.
00.
-0 0.
- 0  3.
-0 0. -0 0. 00.
-0 0.
-0 1.
0 0. -0 0.
-0 0. -0 0. -0 0. -0 0.
-0 4. -0 4. -0 1. - 0  1.
Effects on
unemployment
unemployment (inexp.)
unemployment (exp.)
employment in type a jobs
employment in type b jobs
vacancies for type a jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
wage in a type a job (x100)
wage in a type b job (x100)
wage ratio wdw,  (x100)
“deskilling” flow
promotion flow
vacancy chain (x 100)
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Table 10 Effects of an increase in productivity of segment IS,  yb: +lO  %
baseline I, after baseline II, after
Effects on
1 Yr 10 yrs 20 yrs l Yr
unemployment -14.2 -31.8 -53.0
unemployment (inexp.) -9.9 -35.0 -65.5
unemployment (exp.) -4.3 3.2 12.4
employment in type a jobs -20.5 -317.2 -678.9
employment in type b jobs 34.7 349.0 731.9
vacancies for type u jobs
vacancies for type b jobs
03. -3 1 - 7  2
73. Ii.8 2i.7
wage in a type a job (x100) -0.2 -0.4 -0.9
wage in a type b job (x100) 8.3 8.3 8.3
wage ratio wdw,  (x100) -6.3 -6.6 -7.1
“deskilling” flow -0 . 9 0 6  . 25  .
promotion flow 20  . 38  . 59  .
vacancy chain (x 100) 89. 20.0 35.4
-10.4
-5 9.
-4 4.
-6 9
173.
04.
47.
-0 1.
87.
- 5  7.
-0 4.
07.
23.
1 0 yrs 2 0 yrs
-17.7 -26.1
-16.7 -29.2
-0 . 9 31 .
-126.2 -264.8
143.9 290.9
-1 . 1 -2 8
73  . ld2  .
-0 . 2 -0 . 2
87  . 87  .
-5 . 8 -5 . 9
-0  .  1 -0 . 3
11  . 16 .
40 . 59  .
31
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Figure 2. Effects of an increase or a decrease in bargaining parameter p on
unemployment-trend.
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Figure 3. Effects of a decrease in opening costs k, and kb  on unemployment-trend.
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Figure 4. Effects of an increase in matching-efficiency h, or hb in segment A or B on
unemployment-trend.
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Figure 5. Effects of a decrease in deskilling rate 6 on unemployment-trend.
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Figure 6. Effects of an increase in productivity y, or yb  on unemployment-trend.
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